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RECENT DECISIONS
for pecuniary loss ($15,000) is increased $1500 on account of each
child in excess of two, but not exceeding a total increase of $7500.38
It has been said that such pecuniary loss may include counsel and
advice, in addition to support and such contributions as may have
been made to the child had .the parent lived.37 It should be noted,
however, that the Wisconsin statute limits recovery for loss of the
society and companionship of the deceased to his spouse or parents.38
The tendency of modem law, as reflected in the alienation of af-
fections decisions discussed above,3 9 seems to be away from recogniz-
ing judicially any new rights in children;40 but the vigorous minority
in those cases, characterized by Daily v. Parker,4 ' and the recognition
in some jurisdictions of the right of the wife to sue for loss of the
consortium of her husband,42 are factors difficult to evaluate. In Wis-
consin, in view of the stand taken by the court, against extending to
the child the right to sue for alienation of affections, and especially
the stand on judicial lawmaking,43 it seems safe to say that an action
like the one in the principal case would receive similar treatment.
ROBERT H. GORSKE
Negligence-Foreseeability-Plaintiff was injured when her
husband lost control of a truck, in which they were riding, due to severe
corrugations in the floor covering of a bridge maintained by the defend-
ant. The uneven corrugated surface was caused when a gravel mixture,
which the defendant's employees had used to cover the bridge flooring,
sifted between cracks of the flooring. Defendant maintained that the
development of the dangerous condition was unforeseeable. HELD:
The defense that one- is not liable for unforeseeable consequences of
an act is inapplicable to relieve the actor who negligently sets into
motion a chain of circumstances leading to the final resultant injury.
Pruett v. State through Department of Highways et al., 62 So. 2d 686
(La. 1953).
The court in the prinicipal case has placed itself with the majority
of courts regarding the effect of the foreseeability test' upon the caus-
ation issue. This position is: the duty of care owed a plaintiff is de-
termined with reference to the reasonably anticipated or foreseen in-
jury to that plaintiff. Once the defendant's breach of duty is estab-
Sr WIS. STATS. (1951), §331.04.(45.
37 Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REv. 460, 484-485(1934).
38 WIS. STATS. (1951), §331.04(4).
39 See supra, note 27.
4 See supra, note 26.
41 See supra, note 24.
42 See supra, note 7.
43 Scholberg v. Itnyre, supra, note 27.
138 Am. Jur. Negligence, §58.
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lished, no reference is made, in holding him responsible for the in-
jurious consequences of his act or omission, to the foreseeablity of the
actual result.2
The alternative minority position is: the proximate-causal relation
of negligent act or omission and subsequent injury to another does not
exist except where the injurious consequences were foreseen or reason-
ably foreseeable5
Frequently a jurisdiction has brought itself to the majority posi-
tion from a confused state of the law rather than to a newer position
from a previously well-established minority doctrine. Such has been
the development in Wisconsin.4 Many of the older cases adhered to a
variously worded principle. The substance of it was that a breach of
duty is proximately causal of an injury (i.e. renders one liable) only
in the instances where the injury was a "natural and probable" conse-
quence of the negligence, and ought reasonably to have been anticipated
or foreseen to be such in the perspective of the situation then existing.5
With the Osborne case, Rosenberry, C. J., placed Wisconsin with
the group that adapted themselves to Cardozo's analysis in the Palsgraf
case, drawing the distinction between the operation of foreseeability to
establish negligence, and to limit its legal consequences to the actor.6
Following the distinction it is made clear that assuming negligence
resulting in damage, the actor is entirely liable for all naturally conse-
quent damages, whether reasonably anticipated or foreseen or not.
This principle is confirmed as the law in Wisconsin in the recent
Pfeifer case:
"... foreseeability under our law as it now stands applies
only to the question of negligence or the failure to exercise ordi-
nary care, and not to limit the liability for the consequences of
the wrongful act, . ..",
2Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) ; Gibson v.
Delaware & H. Canal Co., 65 VT. 213, 26 A. 70 (1892).3 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., ibid., (Dissenting opinion); Wood v.
Pennyslvania R. Co., 177 Pa. 306, 35 A. 699 (1896) ; Mellon et al. v. Lehigh
Valley R. Co., 282 Pa. 39, 127 A. 444 (1925); Brush Electric Light & Power
Co. v. Lefevre et ux., 93 Tex. 604, 57 S.W. 640; Palermo v. Orleans Ice Mfg.
Co., 130 La. 833, 58 So. 589; Huber v. The La Crosse City R. Co., 92 Wis.
636, 66 N.W. 708 (1896). Louisiana and Wisconsin have since varied their
positions.
4 Koehler v. Waukesha Milk Co., 190 Wis. 52, 208 N.W. 901 (1926) ; Osborne v.
Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931) ; Pfeifer et al v. Standard
Gateway Theater, Inc., 262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W. 2d 29 (1952) ; See Note, 155
A.L.R. 157 (1945).5 Atkinson v. The Goodrich Transportation Co., 60 Wis. 141, 18 N.W. 764
(1884); Deisenreiter v. The Kraus-Merkel Malting Co., 97 Wis. 279, 72 N.W.
735 (1887) ; Morey v. Lake Superior T. & T. Co., 125 Wis. 148, 103 N.W. 271(1905); Bell Lumber Co. v. Bayfield Transfer Ry. Co., 169 Wis. 357, 172
N.W. 955 (1919); Smith v. Taylor-Button Co., 179 Wis. 232, 190 N.W. 999
(1923).6 Osborne v. Montgomery, upra, note 4, 203 Wis. at 234.
7 Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc., supra, note 4, 262 Wis. at 235.
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The position that the problem is a question of an interpersonal
duty of care could conceivably give into the court's hands more ex-
tensive control of the case than does the minority. theory.8 Not only
does the primary question of duty rest with the court, but the court
further reserves to itself the power in other than "mine run" negligence
cases,
"... to decide as a matter of law whether or not considera-
tions of public policy require that there b.e no liability."9
The Wisconsin case ofLindgren v. LaCrosse County offers facts
virtually parallel with those in the principal case.10 Chuck holes in a
road, recently filled by a governmental unit, were washed out by
rains, which were expected to fall, as was the gravel mixture in the
principal case expected to sift between the bridge flooring. The court
found that there was no breach of an interpersonal duty in the absence
of actual or constructive notice to the governmental unit that the road
had fallen into disrepair.
The trend to the majority rule creates unexpected novelties, and
replaces the older observation that a difference in method of approach
does not necessarily require a different result,11 with the proposition
that a similar method of approach does not necessarily require a sim-
ilar result.1 2 The majority view represents a developing judicial self-
confidence in the ability of the court to exercise discretion in deter-
mining, proper conduct among the complexities of human affairs. The
early cases invariably preferred the flexibility of the law to reside in a
kind of "formula elasticity," which relieved the court of any personal
responsibility for, or authority over, the judgment. The current law
permits legal flexibility to reside in a kind of "administrative elastic-
ity" which causes the court to assume the personal responsibility for a
circumspect judgment.
It remains to determine whether the frequent past use of the "na-
tural and probable" phrase, together with the "foreseeability" require-
ment, will permit an identification of "natural and probable" conse-
quences of a breach of duty with "foreseeable" consequences of the
same.1 3 It had been speculated that the conjunctive use of the phrases
8 Warren A. Seavey, Mr. Justice Cordozo and the Law of Torts, 52 H-ARv. LAw
REv. 372, 383.
9 Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc., supra, note 4.2OLindgren v. LaCrosse County, 231 Wis. 347, 285 N.W. 772 (1934).
3. Mosely v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal. 2d 213, 157 P. 2d 372 (1945).
12 It is proposed that the Lindgren case is already an application of the maxim.
In that case the considerations upon which judicial discretion refused ajudgment for plaintiff were: the plaintiff's contributory negligence (even
despite a comparative negligence statute), the relative "nuisance" character of
the plaintiff's injury, and the infeasibility of a more substantial highway re-
pair. None of these elements was present in the principal case.
1s Atkinson v. The Goodrich. Transportation Co., supra, note 5; Andrews v.
C.M. & St. Paul R. Co., 96 Wis. 348, 71 N.W. 372 (1897); Maitland v. The
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was redundant in testing the actionability of negligence.1 4 The court
seems to have confirmed that speculation, first by establishing that fore-
seeability cannot limit liability for the consequences of the negligence, 15
and then by declaring that the law in Wisconsin is not restricted to
holding actors liable only for natural and probable consequences, but
can impose liability for natural consequences that were probable or
not.1 6 The effect of this is to establish that probability of a natural
consequence was always foreseeability, though separately expressed
in conjunction with it for emphasis. The confusion is now laid to rest:
"We have used the 'natural and probable' phrase from time
to time when it was not of particular moment...-11
Unfortunately, disposing of half of a conjunctive usage as a re-
dundancy does not halve the problem. The law is left with a single,
clearly-expressed test of liability for consequences of negligence. The
test is isolated, but what will satisfy it? What is a "natural conse-
quence ?"
Definitions are to be had which include the questioned word in them
and are, for that reason, unsatisfactory.' 8 The sum of the definitions
leads to the following conclusion: the test in Wisconsin of natural conse-
quence is the sine q"i non ("but for") proof of the series of events.' 9
That proof is sufficiently restricted to render it practically useful by
limiting the meaning of "substantial factor" (that without the contri-
bution of which the injury would not have occurred) to those of the
real, philosophic causes as are popularly and reasonably regarded to
impute responsibility.20
The Wisconsin law presently touching the issue lends itself to a
systematic formulation:
1. The question of foreseeability is applied only to the issue
of an interpersonal duty, not to proximate cause.
2. Breach of duty is the proximate cause of naturally con-
sequent injuries.
Gilbert Paper Co., 97 Wis. 476, 72 N.W. 1124 (1897); Stefanowski v. Chain
Belt Co., 129 Wis. 484, 109 N.W. 532 (1906); Schabow v. Wisconsin T., L.,
H. & P. Co., 162 Wis. 175, 155 N.W. 951 (1916).
145 Wis. L. Rav. 142 (1928).
15 Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc., supra, note 4.16 Osborne v. Montgomery, supra, note 4; Bengston v. Estes, 260 Wis. 595, 51
N.W. 2d 539 (1951) ; Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc., supra, note 4.
17 Bengston v. Estes, ibid., 260 Wis. at 600.
is [Negligence] is the natural cause when either it acts directly in producing the
injury, or sets in motion other causes so producing it and forming a continu-
ous chain in natural sequence down to the injury; thus linking the negligence
with the injury by a chain of natural and consequential causation, although
the former may be neither the immediate nor the direct cause of the event.
Meyer v. Milwaukee Elect. Ry. & Light Co., 116 Wis. 336, 93 N.W. 6 (1903);
Winchel v. Goodyear, 126 Wis. 271, 105 N.W. 824 (1905).
19 Bell L. Co. v. Bayfield T. R. Co., 169 Wis. 357, 172 N.W. 955 (1919).
20 Schultz v. Brogan, 251 Wis. 390, 29 N.W. 2d 719 (1947); Walton v. Blauert,
256 Wis. 125. 40 N.W. 2d 545 (1949) ; Siblik v. Motor Transport Co., 262 Wis.
242, 55 N.W. 2d 8 (1952).
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3. A natural consequence is the effect of a sine qua non
("but for") cause, tempered by popular reason and judicial dis-
cretion.
Whether the court will elect to restrict itself by even this most liberal,
organized whole requires a decision embracing it.
How -m EQuiTz
Divorce-The Effect of a Prior Divorce Judgment on a Subse-
quent Action for Alimony and Support-In 1946 plaintiff wife
procured a valid absolute divorce in Connecticut, which was her
domicile at the time, against her non-resident spouse upon constructive
service. Subsequently, she brought an action in California to obtain
alimony and support, at which time, she conceded that the "in per-
sonam" provisions of the Connecticut decree were invalid because of
lack of jurisdiction over her spouse. The former husband made a
general appearance in the California action, and appealed from the
judgement in favor of the plaintiff. Held: Reversed. The application
for alimony is a collateral proceeding or episode within the action for
divorce, authorized for a particular purpose, but dependent for its
maintenance upon the existence of the action. After the judgment
granting the divorce the plaintiff was no longer the wife of the de-
fendant, and he no longer owed her any marital duty. From that
time she could enforce against him no obligation not imposed by the
court at the time of the judgment. Dimon v. Dimon, 254 P.2d 528
(Cal.1953).
The courts are divided on the question as to whether a wife's
suit for alimony, subsequent to a valid foreign divorce decree, may
be maintained. Local rules on that question depend, in the first in-
stance, upon whether such a divorce is thought to be divisible or
indivisible in regard to its effect upon the marital status of either
spouse on the one hand, and upon the wife's right to alimony on the
other.'
There is a line of cases which support the view that a wife may
obtain alimony from her former husband, notwithstanding a valid ex-
isting ex parte divorce decree in a jurisdiction in which the husband
did not appear or reside.2 These decisions point out that it was im-
possible for the wife to recover an allowance for support at the time
of the divorce decree because the court lacked personal jurisdiction
over the husband. If the question of support could not be litigated
I See Note, 28 A.L.R. 2d 1378.
2 Stephanson v. Stephanson, 54 Ohio App. 239, 6 N.E. 1005 (1936); Darnell v.
Darnell, 212 Ill. App. 601 (1918) ; Miller v. Miller, 186 Okla. 566, 99 P. 2d 515(1940); Nelson v. Nelson, 71 S.D. 342, 24 N.W. 2d 327 (1946); Pawley v.
Pawley, Fla. 46 So. 2d 464 (1950); Searles v. Searles, 140 Minn. 385, 168
N.W. 133 (1918).
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